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Abstract 
 
This paper builds on previous research by using the hedonic price method to estimate the 
value of an acre-foot of irrigation water in Douglas County, Oregon. The analysis uses 
detailed structural, location, and amenity information for 113 arms-length transactions of 
farmland in Douglas County, Oregon between 2000 and 2001. Results from a hedonic 
analysis are consistent with other studies.  Estimates for the value of leasing water are 
provided using different discount rates and a range of timeframes.  
 
Introduction 
 
The Umpqua River Basin in Douglas County, Oregon encompasses over 3 million 
acres (Figure 1). Timber and agriculture are the primary industries in Douglas County 
with livestock production on pasture and alfalfa being the dominant form of agriculture. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Douglas County, Oregon (Douglas County, Oregon Assessment and 
Taxation 2002) 
 Water rights for the North and South Umpqua rivers and their tributaries are 
heavily subscribed resulting in low instream flows for some streams during the summer 
months.  The right to use water for irrigation is no longer being appropriated for much of 
the basin including all of the South Umpqua and its tributaries.  Many tributaries are 
included on the Clean Water Act 303 (d) list. 
Inadequate stream flows have been cited as a factor in the decline of anadramous 
and resident fish populations. Spring and fall chinook, coho salmon, chum salmon, 
summer and winter steelhead, sea-run cutthroat and resident cutthroat and resident 
rainbow trout are found in the basin (Oregon Water Trust 2004).  Coho are listed as 
threatened and coastal cutthroat are listed as endangered under the Endangered Species 
Act; Umpqua summer and winter steelhead are candidates for listing (NOAA 2004). 
Recovery plans emphasize the importance of improving water quantity and enhancing 
stream flows for aquatic habitat, fisheries and ecological systems.   
Higher stream flows can be achieved using water saving technologies and by 
purchasing or leasing water rights. While the incorporation of water saving technologies 
may decrease the amount of water taken out of a stream by one user, these technologies 
do not guarantee that stream flows will improve because landowners with junior water 
rights may still withdraw water. 
The purchase or lease of a senior water right can provide greater certainty about 
stream flows since instream use is equivalent to other water rights under the doctrine of 
prior appropriation.  In times of low flows, however, certain beneficial uses receive 
preferential treatment. Human consumption, livestock consumption, and irrigation of 
non-commercial gardens that do not exceed one-half acre are given preferential 
consideration in the Umpqua River Basin over other beneficial uses. 
Water rights can be purchased or leased in Oregon. A total of 114 leases and 5 
purchases occurred between January 1995 and December 1999 (Loomis et al. 2003). The 
average price paid per acre-foot was $243 (1999 dollars). Groups that purchase and lease 
water rights in Oregon include the Bonneville Power Administration, Oregon Water 
Trust, Deschutes Resource Conservancy, and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation.  
This paper uses the hedonic pricing method to estimate the minimum payment a 
seller would be willing to accept for a water right.  The analysis takes into account 
characteristics of a property such as its size, soil productivity, assessed value of 
residential and non-residential buildings, assessed timber value, and whether a property 
has a water right.  The second section of this paper describes relevant literature. This is 
followed by an overview of the hedonic price method, a description of the data used in 
the analysis, results, and conclusions. 
 
Literature 
 
 The value of water has been estimated using several techniques including the 
hedonic price method, farm crop budget analysis, and linear programming. 
Crouter (1987) explores the possibility of separate markets for land and water in 
Weld Country, Colorado. Crouter hypothesizes that if the value for land and water rights 
can be estimated separately using the hedonic price method, and if water rights can be 
repackaged linearly, then a separate water market for land and water exists. Although 
Weld County has no legal restrictions preventing the formation of a separate market for 
land and water, Crouter was unable to establish their existence. 
       Faux and Perry (1999) use the hedonic price method to estimate the value of a water 
right for an acre-foot of water in Malheur County, Oregon. The authors’ value irrigation 
water by taking the difference between irrigated land classes and a non-irrigated land 
class.  The value of water per acre-foot is estimated to be $147 for the least fertile land 
and $729 dollars for the most fertile land.  
Farm crop budget analyses use agricultural production budgets to estimate the 
value of water. The maximum amount a farmer would be willing to pay for water is 
estimated by taking the difference between total crop revenue and non-water input costs. 
This technique has been applied to wheat, grain sorghum, corn, cotton, soybeans, and rice 
(Gibbons 1986). 
Turner and Perry (1997) use the linear programming technique to estimate the 
price of irrigation water in the Deschutes Basin, Oregon. The authors’ estimate that water 
needed to restore habitat in the Deschutes River could be purchased from the Central 
Oregon Irrigation District for less than $70 an acre-foot. 
 
Hedonic Price Method 
 
 The hedonic price method uses the price of a marketed good, such as a property, 
to value a characteristic of the good that is not formally traded on a market (Freeman 
1993). This technique has been used to estimate the value of open space proximity, air 
and water pollution, and scenic views. 
The hedonic function for land is: 
 P = P(QS,QA,QNR,QWR )  
where   QS is the vector representing soil quality,  QA represents total acreage,   QNR is non-
residential improvements, and   QWR  is the water right.  Soil quality and total acreage are 
assumed to be exogenous while non-residential improvements and water rights are 
endogenous. 
The functional form for the hedonic price model is uncertain (Freeman 1993).  A 
semi-log form is estimated since simpler functional forms are found to produce better 
results when information is missing (Cropper et al. 1988). 
The statistical model is represented by: 
  ln price =β1QS +β2QA +β3QNR +β4QWR + ui  
where lnprice is the log of the sale price per acre and uj is the error term. The constant is 
dropped to avoid collinearity with the land class variables. 
 
Data Set 
 
Variables that reflect a property’s characteristics, and the productivity of the land 
on which the structure is located, were selected from the Douglas County, Oregon 
Assessor’s “Farm Sales Report” (2000, 2001).  Information on the physical location of 
the property was obtained through the Douglas County, Oregon Assessor’s web site 
(2002). The data set, after cleaning for missing values and checking for arms-length 
transactions, includes 195 of 210 sales.1  Of the 195 sales, 113 were in the property 
classes designated for farmland.  
The dependent variable is the log of sale price per acre. Explanatory variables and 
their hypothesized relationship to the dependent variable are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Explanatory Variables 
Variable Name Description Expected 
Relationship 
to the 
Dependent 
Variable 
RESIDENCE Assessed value of residential buildings divided 
by total acreage 
Positive 
IMPROVE Assessed value of non-residential 
improvements divided by total acreage 
Positive 
TIMBER Assessed value of timber divided by total 
acreage 
Positive 
ACRES Total acreage Positive 
ACRES2 Total acreage squared Negative 
WATER Dummy variable =1 if land has a water right Positive 
LAND1 Acres of land class k2 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND2 Acres of land class k3 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND3 Acres of land class b2 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND4 Acres of land class b3 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND5 Acres of land class b5 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND6 Acres of land class h5 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND7 Acres of land class h7 divided by total acreage Positive 
LAND8 Acres of land class ff divided by total acreage Positive 
PROP_A Dummy variable = 1 if property has no water or 
designated forestland  
 
Uncertain 
PROP_B Dummy variable = 1 if water is on the property Uncertain 
PROP_C Dummy variable = 1 if the property has some 
designated forestland  
Excluded 
ACRES*WATER Interactive variable: total acreage and irrigation Negative 
 
A hedonic price model typically includes detailed information about the structural 
attributes of residential and non-residential buildings and the age, type, and quantity of 
trees. This information, however, is not maintained by the Douglas County, Oregon 
Assessor’s Office, so the assessed value of residential buildings, non-residential 
buildings, and timber are used in the model. 
                                                 
1 All observations that sold for less than $5,000 or $300 per acre were dropped under the 
assumption that they were not arms-length transactions. Three observations were dropped 
because they were the only observations in their land class.  
The percentage of land in each land class was calculated for each property.  Land 
classes, which capture soil productivity, are preferred to a condensed soil variable such as 
a soil quality index (Faux and Perry 1999). The model also includes three dummy 
variables representing thirty-one property classes.  These property classes help identify 
properties with special zoning restrictions or taxes. Many classes had only one or two 
observations so similar classes were grouped together.   
The presence of a water right is included as a dummy variable. A review of water 
rights records determined that the nineteen irrigated properties in this study are allotted 
2.5 acre-feet a year. We assume that the entire allocation is used but recognize that 
overuse will bias the value per acre-foot upward.  
There are two reasons why seniority is not included in the model.   First, relative 
seniority is hard to identify.  For example, a water right from 1950 may be the senior 
right on one tributary, while a water right from 1940 may be a junior right on a different 
tributary. Second, the sample contains only nineteen irrigated properties. This limits our 
ability to create dummy variables to represent properties located on specific tributaries.  
Finally, an interactive variable was generated to capture the interaction between 
total acreage and irrigation. Summary statistics are provided Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Observations 
Mean Sale 
Price per 
Acre ($) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Sale Price 
Per Acre 
Maximum 
Sale Price 
Per Acre 
Full Data Set 113 6,773 7,784 414 37,238 
Irrigated 
Observations 19 6,918 8,193 414 37,238 
 
Results 
 
  Several models were developed to explain the sale price per acre of properties in 
the study area.  The final model was selected based on goodness of fit.  Results are 
reported in Table 3.   
The assessed property value variables, assessed timber value per acre, assessed 
improvement value per acre and assessed residential value per acre were all positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficients on these variables are interpreted as the percent 
increase in the mean sale price from a one-dollar increase in assessed price. For example, 
a $1,000 increase in assessed value of non-residential improvements is estimated to 
increase a property’s sale price per-acre by 10.9% or $730.  Non-residential buildings are 
overvalued since the estimated increase in sale price per-acre is less than the increase in 
assessed value.  Residential buildings are also overvalued. 
The coefficient on the timber variable indicates that timber is undervalued.  The 
result is not surprising since taxes on woodlots in this data set are based on an appraised 
value of the timber on the lot.  Assessors consider this tax a “special use” tax and 
therefore undervalue the timber (Landgren and Elwood 1997). 
Total acreage is significantly negative and total acreage squared is significantly 
positive. These results are counter to initial expectations, but can be explained by 
assuming that the land on which a residence is located is the most expensive piece of 
land.  Given this assumption, as total acreage increases the average sale price per acre 
decreases, but at a diminishing rate.    
 The coefficients on the property class dummies (PROP_A and PROP_B) are 
positive and significant. Properties in PROP_A and PROP_B are estimated to sell for 
80.27% and 32.22% more, respectively, than properties in the excluded category 
(PROP_C).  The result from an F-test allows us to reject the hypothesis that these 
coefficients are equal (F (2, 96) = 8.25).  
The PROP_A property class includes farmland with no water or designated 
forestland.  Properties in this class are subject to fewer restrictions and tax considerations 
than the other categories. Properties that intersect water are included in the PROP_B 
category.  The presence of water on a property may reduce the amount of land available 
for farming.  Additionally, these farms are subject to regulations that may increase the 
cost of farming because of their location in the Umpqua Basin Agricultural Water Quality 
Management Area. 
We were not able to determine if the properties in our study are zoned for 
exclusive farm use or if portions of the property can be developed. Faux and Perry (2001) 
find that the ability to add a residential building to a plot of land zoned for farming 
increases the sale price of the land by around $6,000.  
 The soil class variables are all statistically significant and of similar magnitude.  
Individual F-tests reveal some differences when one land class is compared directly to 
another.  The null hypothesis that all land classes are equal is rejected.  
 The dummy variable for irrigation is positive and statistically significant. This 
coefficient is interpreted as the mean effect of irrigation water on a property’s sale price. 
The presence of a water right is estimated to increase the sale price per-acre of property 
by almost 30%. 
 The interactive variable for acres and irrigation is negative and significant 
indicating that irrigation becomes less valuable on a per-acre basis as acreage increases.  
There are two explanations for this coefficient.  First, the dummy variable representing 
water rights indicates that the property has a water right, but it does not mean that water 
is available for the entire property. Because land without a water right is less valuable 
then land with a water right, additional non-irrigated land decreases the expected sale 
price per-acre. Another explanation is that water rights holders with smaller allocations 
use the right more efficiently, that is, the marginal product of a water right decreases as 
more rights are obtained.  
 
Table 3: Regression Results 
Variable Name Coefficient P-value 
RESIDENCE 0.00008 .000 
IMPROVE 0.00010 .000 
TIMBER 0.00016 .000 
ACRES -0.006 .000 
ACRES2 7.10 e -6 .000 
WATER 0.2599 .035 
LAND1 8.485 .000 
LAND2 8.177 .000 
LAND3 8.139 .000 
LAND4 7.871 .000 
LAND5 8.155 .000 
LAND6 7.750 .000 
LAND7 7.876 .000 
LAND8 7.876 .000 
PROP_A 0.58928 .000 
PROP_B 0.27929 .000 
ACRES*WATER -0.00182 .012 
R-squared = .89; N=113 
 
Estimating a Price for Irrigation Water 
 
 The estimated willingness to accept for an acre-foot of water is based on two 
coefficients: the irrigation dummy variable and the size and irrigation interactive variable.  
 A property with a water right is estimated to sell for almost 30% ($2,053) more 
than a property without a water right. Because irrigated properties in our study are 
allotted 2.5 acre-feet a year, the price per acre-foot of irrigation water is estimated to be 
$821.  The average size of irrigated properties in the data set is 105 acres. The price of an 
acre of water right for the average size property in the data set is $-1,322. Dividing by 2.5 
results in a reduction in the price of an acre-foot of irrigation water of  $529.  Combining 
these effects gives a value of $292 for one acre-foot of water.     
 Many organizations are interested in short-term leases that will help in 
emergency situations.  Thus 1, 3, and 5-year leases are common.  Discount rates ranging 
from 2-10% were used to calculate the willingness-to-accept for a 1-year lease. 
 
Table 4: One-year lease 
Discount Rate Price Per Acre-Foot 
2% $5.84 
5% $14.60 
6% $17.52 
7% $20.44 
10% $29.20 
 
 
Estimates of the value of lease rates for multiple year contracts are presented in Table 5.   
 
Table 5: Multiple time frames and discount rates (price per acre-foot) 
Discount rate 3 years 5 years 10 years 20 years 
2% $16.84 $27.52 $52.46 $95.49 
5% $39.76 $63.20 $112.74 $181.95 
6% $46.83 $73.79 $128.95 $200.95 
7% $53.63 $83.80 $143.57 $216.54 
10% $72.62 $110.70 $179.43 $248.61 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This paper uses the hedonic technique to estimate the value of an acre-foot of 
irrigation water in Douglas County, Oregon. The estimated willingness to accept for the 
purchase of an acre-foot of water is $292 which is very close to the reported average 
price per acre foot of $243 (1999 dollars) for purchases in Oregon (Loomis et al. 2003).  
The willingness to accept for leasing is estimated using multiple discount rates and time 
frames. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB 2004) suggests using a real 
discount rate of 7% which gives a range of lease values per acre-foot of approximately 
$20 for a one-year lease to approximately $217 for a twenty-year lease. 
Few water rights transactions have taken place in the Umpqua Basin, Oregon.   
The most recent lease, which was negotiated by the Oregon Water Trust, occurred in the 
summer of 2003.  Oregon Water Trust paid eighty-five dollars per-acre foot of water for a 
5-year lease for one of the oldest water rights on the South Umpqua (Parrot 2004).  This 
negotiated amount is consistent with the results of this study assuming a 7% discount 
rate.  
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